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4 September 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

**SUBJECT: Briefing Note on Advance Portion of NIE 11-5-59:
SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN GUIDED MISSILES AND
SPACE VEHICLES**

BACKGROUND

This advance portion of the forthcoming estimate is submitted in response to USIB instruction that, as soon as possible after the meeting of the Hyland Panel, those sections of the estimate dealing with certain offensive missile systems be presented to the USIB for approval. The present draft was prepared by ONE largely on the basis of the GMAIC contribution, taking into account the views of the Hyland Panel. Several important substantive issues remain unresolved.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

Page 4, para 4: Army would give greater weight to the possibility of BW use in missiles. We recommend holding to the text, and we anticipate that Army may be willing to drop the point.

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Page 10, para 16: Air believes major setbacks have probably occurred in testing a new, large ICBM (see their next reservation below). We believe the remainder of the paragraph in the text supports the sentence in question.

Page 11, para 17: Air believes the USSR has developed two different ICBMs, a smaller one which became operational in prototype in early 1959 and a larger one which is now under test and will become operational soon. Air's views have been submitted to GMAIC and the Hyland Panel, and in neither body have they won any support. Air intends to present its position in some detail at the USIB meeting. (The Air reservation carries forward to page 12 para. 19, page 14 para 21, page 16 para 26, and the table on page 18.)

Page 12, para 19: State, Army, Navy and Joint Staff hold the first half of the 1960 as the probably IOC date for the Soviet ICBM. The views of the dissenting agencies are those of their GMAIC representatives, and there is a fair chance that the principals will be willing to withdraw or compromise these reservations. The text represents ONE's attempt,

in view of the uncertainties and the conflicting expert testimony, to arrive at a reasonable spread on IOC date for national planning purposes. It reflects our interpretation of the Hyland Panel's conclusions. It should be noted that OSI favors an IOC in mid-1959 or earlier, while Chairman CMAIC does not believe it has yet occurred. Although neither Col White nor Col MacFarland took formal reservations, we recommend that they be invited to comment on the text at the briefing session. (The State, Army, Navy, and Joint Staff reservations carry forward to the table on page 18.)

Page 15, para 24: Air wishes to show CEP as 3-5 n. m.,

falling between theoretical and degraded accuracy. We believe the text implies a spread of uncertainty, but neither CMAIC nor Hyland Panel was able to arrive at a finite lower limit.

Page 19, para 32 and table on following page: Navy believes

the submarine-launched cruise-type missile has a maximum range of 200 n. m. We recommend the text,

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which reflects the interpretation held by all other agencies
of what we believe is good evidence from test flights.

Page 20, para 33: Navy believes sub-launched ballistic
missiles are probably now in operation. In light of
the tenuous evidence, we recommend the text's evalua-
tion of possible, which is the interpretation of all other
agencies.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

ABBOT SMITH
Acting Chairman

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